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In this issue...
International authorities are on the verge of a serious 
error − failing to address the overuse of Too-Big-to-Fail 
policies as the most important issue facing them.






































































































































8The bailouts carried out by governments for large banks and other financial entities in the
recent financial turbulence are often characterized as a Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) policy.
Proponents of such a policy argue that preventing the failure of large banks (and possibly other
financial and non-financial entities) is necessary to limit the impact that such a failure might
have on other institutions or on the real economy. Opponents argue that while such a policy
might seem attractive in the short run, even given the enormous financial cost to government
associated with its intervention, the long-run costs are even larger and are almost always
ignored, making TBTF a poor policy choice. 
This Commentary contributes to the current debate by examining why the authorities almost
inevitably follow TBTF policies. It assesses the short- and long-run benefits and costs of using
a TBTF policy and suggests reforms to the regulatory and supervisory arrangements governing
banks that could significantly reduce the authorities’ perceived need for TBTF policies.
The author recommends a four-step strategy to stabilize the financial system:
￿ First, the authorities should recognize that they have relied excessively on TBTF when
dealing with problem banks and other financial and non-financial entities.
￿ Second, they must recognize they are "hooked on" TBTF as the current policy of
choice despite the fact that it produces significant moral hazard, generates more costs
than benefits and is likely to result in more frequent and more severe financial problems
in the future. 
￿ Third, ways need to be found to reduce the likelihood of TBTF being used, whether 
by lowering the likelihood of large bank failures or finding alternatives to help resolve
financially troubled large banks.
￿ Finally, one must acknowledge that there are rare circumstances in which TBTF may 
be the only appropriate policy response. 
While Canada did not experience the same difficulties as other countries, it was hit by the
fallout and introduced TBTF-type policies, although there were no bailouts of large banks.
And while Canada is fortunate to have a better regulatory framework than most, the
authorities still need to address a number of the policy actions suggested in the paper. 
The paper concludes with a warning that international authorities now are on the verge of
making their most serious error-failing to address the overuse of TBTF as the most important
issue facing them.
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T
he financial sector in many
countries with large and
sophisticated financial systems
has undergone considerable turmoil
in recent years. Governments in these
countries, when faced with the
prospects  of the failure of large
banks, non-bank financial
institutions and even non-financial
corporations, have resorted to
bailouts. The bailouts for large banks
and other financial entities took a
variety of forms: government
recapitalization of insolvent or non-
viable entities, guarantees (explicit
and implicit) to uninsured creditors,
special central bank programs to
provide liquidity well beyond the
typical lender of last resort role,
relaxed regulation and supervision of
financial institutions as well as special
programs to provide direct credit or
to facilitate access to credit by
households and businesses as banks
reduced their lending.
In Canada, the Bank of Canada expanded its
liquidity framework by lengthening terms to
maturity of various facilities, expanding the size of its
facilities and transactions and expanding the range 
of counterparties and eligible securities that could be
used to acquire liquidity. The federal government
announced measures intended to improve access to
financing for Canadian households and businesses at
a potential cost of up to $200 billion.
1 These
initiatives included measures to purchase insured
mortgage pools, to buy securities backed by loans
and leases on vehicles and equipment and increased
resources for the Export Development Corporation
(EDC) and the Business Development Bank of
Canada, temporary expansion of EDC’s mandate to
support financing in the domestic market and
“assurance facilities” to provide insurance on the
wholesale borrowings of federally and provincially
regulated deposit-taking institutions and federally
regulated life insurance companies. Finally, the
Office of the Superintendent of Financial
Institutions relaxed its capital rules to permit a
greater use of preferred shares by federally regulated
deposit-taking institutions.
2
The Bank of England calculated that the potential
cost of such extraordinary interventions amounted to
95 percent of 2007 nominal GDP for the United
Kingdom, 75 percent for the United States and 30
percent for the continental euro area.
3 Actual
interventions, which included capital injections to
banks, special purpose vehicles to deal with problem
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The author thanks Walter Engert, Chuck Freedman and Philippe Bergevin for their helpful comments and guidance. Comments from the
participants at the C.D. Howe Institute Financial Services Research Initiative Spring Meeting 2010, and those who reviewed a draft of this paper
subsequent to that are gratefully acknowledged.
1 Bank of Canada 2009.
2 In the US certain investment banks were given unprecedented access to the discount window at the Federal Reserve, money market mutual
fund unit holders were provided with 100 percent government guarantees, non-interest-bearing transaction accounts of businesses were
provided with unlimited deposit insurance coverage, deposit insurance coverage was increased from $100K to $250K, new government
facilities were created to guarantee any new debt issued by financial institutions, and the Fed created a new facility to purchase commercial
paper directly from the corporate sector (effectively extending lender of last resort access to the corporate sector). In addition, financial
assistance was provided to a number of failing financial and non-financial entities. In the UK, unlimited insurance was provided to all retail
depositors of Northern Rock Bank, a recapitalization scheme (cost: 50 billion pounds) was introduced for major UK banks and large
building societies, a special liquidity scheme to swap purportedly high-quality (but illiquid) assets for treasury bills was introduced (cost: 50
billion pounds), term repo conditions were changed to allow for large transactions involving an expanded list of securities, and a government
guarantee was offered for short- and medium-term debt issues of financial institutions (cost: 250 billion pounds).
3  Total costs are based on the potential size of the various packages announced by governments including insurance, investments in financial
institutions, and central bank and government lending to financial institutions including direct holdings of various assets. Bank of England
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assets, guarantees of first tranches losses and direct
holdings of assets through such things as asset
purchase facilities, amounted to 15 percent, 
20 percent and 5 percent of 2007 GDP for 
these countries respectively. (Note that these 
estimates exclude any unlimited guarantees 
that are not easily quantifiable.)
The fiscal costs of Canada’s interventions were
not as large as those of other major countries for 
a variety of reasons.  The Canadian financial
economy was less exposed at the start of the 
crisis − private and public-sector balance sheets 
were in better shape than most countries. In
addition, Canadian banks were much better
capitalized than other global banks (well above
minimum international standards) and,
importantly, Canadian banks had significantly 
less leverage than many of their international peers.
(Large Canadian banks were levered about 18 times
versus 25 to 35 times in other countries and 
40 times for large US investment banks.) 
Furthermore, the Canadian mortgage market did
not have a large sub-prime component and there
was not the proliferation of products and marketing
practices that led to serious problems elsewhere. In
Canada, high-ratio mortgage lending must be
insured against default and the government largely
backs that insurance. Prudent lending standards
must be met to qualify for government-backed
insurance. In addition, only about 25 percent of
Canadian mortgages were securitized at the onset 
of the global financial turmoil in 2008 compared 
to 60 per cent in the United States, and these
mortgages were typically of a higher quality.
There were a number of other reasons for
Canada’s relative resiliency, including banks with 
a culture of conservative behaviour and a single
solvency regulator with a clear mandate that
recognizes banks can fail.
4 In many other
countries, there were multiple regulators, often with
unclear or conflicting mandates.
5 In addition,
Canada’s single regulator practised consolidated
supervision and, together with the Canada Deposit
Insurance Corporation, had powers to move
quickly to address issues including, if necessary, a
special bankruptcy regime for financial institutions,
the absence of which caused considerable
difficulties in England. And, of course, there was
some good luck. 
The variety of actions taken by governments and
their agents vis-à-vis financial institutions in the
recent financial turbulence is often characterized as
a Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) policy. Proponents of
such a policy argue that preventing the failure of
large banks (and possibly other financial and non-
financial entities) is necessary to limit the impact
that such a failure might have on other institutions
or on the real economy. Opponents argue that
while such a policy might seem attractive in the
short run, even given the enormous financial cost
to government associated with its intervention, the
long-run costs are even larger and are almost always
ignored, making TBTF a poor policy choice. 
This Commentary contributes to the current
debate by examining why the authorities almost
inevitably follow TBTF policies. It assesses the
short- and long-run benefits and costs of using a
TBTF policy and suggests reforms to the regulatory
and supervisory arrangements governing banks that
could significantly reduce the authorities’ perceived
need for TBTF policies.
6 
C.D. Howe Institute
4  See Ratnovski and Huang 2009. The authors identify two main factors underlying Canadian banks’ relative resilience during the recent
turmoil: a higher share of liabilities in depository funding (as opposed to wholesale, market-based funding), and a number of regulatory 
and structural factors in the Canadian market that reduced banks’ incentives to take excessive risks. 
5  See Dickson 2010a. 
6 To understand why TBTF is almost always used to resolve failing large banks requires a consideration of what it is that banks do and why
their potential failure is usually seen as a more catastrophic event than is the failure of a large non-bank entity. The appendix to this
commentary discusses why banks are considered special in the financial system, why the way in which they carry out their intermediation
operations leave them potentially vulnerable to runs by their depositors and other creditors, and the private- and public-sector arrangements
that have been used to promote the safety of banks. In particular, it explains why the nature of banking is most countries, which involves
“borrowing short and lending long”  and acting as a delegated monitor for its depositors in the lending of their funds, has led governments
to provide a financial safety net for banks.TBTF Benefits and Costs 
Despite financial safety nets and special
regulatory frameworks, banks will fail, either due to
bad management or bad luck. An institution may
become weak because it has made bad loans that
threaten its solvency, because it has failed to adopt
new technologies that allow it to offer a greater
range of financial produces and services at a lower
cost or because it experiences bad luck from
unforeseeable circumstances. The consequences of a
bank failure are not all bad. Failure serves a valuable
purpose in that it eliminates weaker institutions
and allows more successful ones to fill any void left
by the failure.
The failure, or impending failure, of a large bank
will draw the attention of the authorities in part
because of its impact on numerous creditors and
debtors. However, the primary reason why the
authorities fear large bank failures is the threat to
the solvency of other financial institutions, the
soundness of the financial system as a whole, the
well-being of the economy or, in extreme cases, to
the social order. These fears almost inevitably lead
the authorities to respond by protecting uninsured
creditors of banks from all or most of the losses
they otherwise would face.
7
The Too-Big-To-Fail concept applies to 
banks whose uninsured creditors are perceived 
as being very likely to benefit from discretionary
government support to which they are not 
formally entitled (as would be the case for 
insured depositors, for example) and for which 
they do not pay. TBTF is typically seen as an
implicit government guarantee that goes beyond
explicit deposit insurance programs since
governments usually do not state in advance which
creditors will benefit from the application of TBTF,
nor do they charge for the guarantee.
8,9
TBTF, however, is a bit of misnomer. First,
TBTF is aimed at benefiting a bank’s creditors, not
its shareholders (although such actions allow the
bank and often its current management to continue
operating) . Second, it is not always the size of the
bank that determines whether its creditors will be
the beneficiaries of discretionary government
assistance. The authorities often extend TBTF
support to the creditors of a bank that offers a
unique or important financial function such as
providing special services to the securities markets
or payment systems, or is a key participant in
interbank markets or other markets with a limited
number of participants. In these circumstances,
some commentators refer to such banks as Too
Complex To Fail, Too Big To Liquidate Quickly,
Too Important (or Special or Political) To Fail or
Too Difficult to Fail and Unwind.
10 But whatever
the practice is called, it results in the same
outcome-uninsured creditors of the bank benefit
from discretionary government support provided at
the expense of the taxpayer.
11
For the purpose of this Commentary, TBTF is
discussed as it is applied to large failing banks where
the authorities are uncertain and fearful about the
consequences for other banks, the financial system
as a whole (referred to as systemic concerns in the
Commentary 311 | 3
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7 It is interesting to note that the application of TBTF to a pending large bank failure is quite universal among the authorities whether they
operate in democratic societies or dictatorships, or operate in economies with large and sophisticated financial sectors or relatively primitive
financial sectors. The authorities apparently value the benefits of TBTF very highly.
8 TBTF policies can also be thought of as including special arrangements for bank borrowers since it unwinds losses arising from a problem
bank and reallocates them across society more generally.  (Kane 2009a).
9 Not all TBTF actions involve an overt action or direct financial costs. During the financial turmoil in the 1980s, it was believed that banks
in Canada and other countries were near insolvency because of their large exposure to developing countries (so called LDC loans). In this
case, covert TBTF actions involved forbearance on the part of supervisors regarding the valuation of loans (through delayed recognition of
loan losses and provisioning), reduced or suspended enforcement of capital rules, etc. These covert actions benefit creditors of large banks in
exactly the same manner as a public statement guaranteeing creditors of a large failing bank.
10 Kane (2009a).
11 One has to be careful when identifying the creditors who benefit from TBTF. In almost all cases, uninsured depositors of large banks will be
protected by TBTF. To a lesser extent holders of subordinated debt or other liabilities of the bank may be protected. Rarely will equity
holders benefit from TBTF; in fact, the authorities usually make a point of denying existing shareholders of a failing large bank any direct
government support (although shareholders may have profited by the perceived existence of TBTF because their institution has avoided
market discipline and continued to operate well beyond its useful life).Appendix) or the economy.
12 Economists have
often described these effects as contagion among
financial institutions, or negative externalities.
More recently, “interconnectedness” has been used
to describe these potential spillover effects, and the
Bank of England has used the term “network risk,”
resulting in some institutions becoming “too
important to fail (Bank of England 2009).” These
newer terms may give the impression that negative
spillover effects are associated only with recent
developments in the financial system. Such is not
the case. Concerns about the fallout from large
bank failures have been present for a long time.
13
Like any policy regime, the application of TBTF
will have benefits and costs. This section of the
paper examines these benefits and costs.
Benefits
As discussed below, the use of TBTF is very
expensive, both financially and in terms of the
perverse incentives it creates that are likely to result
in a financial system that is less stable and less
efficient over time. Assuming that the authorities
act in a rational and consistent fashion, the benefits
from TBTF must be perceived as being large
enough to outweigh the costs. So what are these
benefits?
To answer that question, it is first necessary to
identify the authorities’ objectives. The primary
ones are the stability and efficiency of the financial
system.
14 A stable financial system is one that not
only operates smoothly in tranquil times, but is also
one that is robust and resilient in turbulent times. 
It will be characterized by incentives that result in
prudent risk-taking by banks and other regulated
institutions, with creditors of banks applying
market discipline that is consistent with the
achievement of a stable financial system. Such a
system has well-designed supervisory arrangements
that create incentives for bank supervisors and other
authorities to act in the best interests of society as a
whole when dealing with failing large banks. Users
of the services provided by a stable financial system
can be confident of having their expectations met,
whether this involves the repayment of funds lent
to banks or the availability of funds to borrow from
banks at competitive prices. An efficient system is
one that is competitive and produces the widest
range of financial products and services at the least
cost and is capable of innovating new products and
services. 
In light of these objectives, the most important
benefit that the authorities likely perceive from
TBTF is that it will promote stability (at least in the
short-run), preventing spillovers into the rest of the
economy. Instability in the financial system is likely
to influence the availability and the allocation of
credit since large banks play an important role in the
provision of short-run credit to the non-financial
sector, especially households and small- and
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12 TBTF can be applied to banks of any size and for reasons that have nothing to do with potential contagion. Recall that the Canadian
government repaid all uninsured creditors of Northland Bank and Canadian Commercial Bank in the mid-1980s even though each bank
accounted for less than 0.25 per cent of total bank assets and did not offer any special or unique services. In the US, between 1979 and 1989
when roughly 1100 commercial banks failed, 99.7 per cent of all deposit liabilities were fully protected through the discretionary actions of
the US authorities (Feldman and Stern 2009). Such bailouts, although not driven by systemic or contagion concerns, do serve to reinforce
the expectation of TBTF being applied to large banks, since creditors and others will reason that if a government cannot tolerate the failure
of an inconsequential bank, it will never allow a large bank to fail. 
13 TBTF is a term that has mostly been used in the US, and appears to have its origins there. It became popular in the mid-1980s during the
bailout of Continental Illinois Bank and again in the early 1990s when legislation was introduced to try to limit the extent of discretionary
government protection offered to the creditors of potentially insolvent large banks (the so-called prompt corrective action regime). The
Continental Illinois bailout marked the first time that US banking supervisors publicly stated that a bank was TBTF. Indeed, the bank
supervisor at the time was drawn into stating that creditors of the 11 largest banks in the US would receive the same bailout as Continental
Illinois’ creditors should those banks become insolvent. However, the idea had been discussed publicly at least a decade earlier by
commentators in reference to US government loan guarantees offered to Lockheed Corporation and to the US government bailout of
Chrysler. See also Kaufman (2003).
14 In addition to safety and efficiency, policy makers’ objectives might also include: (i) domestic control and ownership of major players in the
financial sector; (ii) the establishment of a level playing field among competitors from different jurisdictions (foreign or domestic) or among
institutions operating under different legislation; (iii) limiting concentration of economic power; (iv) limiting concentration of financial
market power; (v) safeguarding the impartiality of the credit granting process; (vi) protecting domestic institutions from foreign competition;
(viii) promoting a favoured sector in the economy, such as small businesses or residential mortgage lending and home ownership; and, (viii)
promoting the reach of a given jurisdiction. Commentary 311 | 5
medium-sized businesses. Financial problems at
large banks could raise the costs of intermediation at
all banks, increase the cost and reduce the supply of
credit and ultimately affect aggregate demand,
which in turn could have significant effects on
output and employment. 
Banks are also involved in the provision of 
day-to-day liquidity to other financial-system
participants. If this liquidity disappears, markets
will not function near their usual capacity or at
their normal prices, again resulting in a negative
impact. The authorities see bailing out uninsured
creditors of large failing banks as a means of
stabilizing the financial system, keeping credit
flowing and maintaining the level of economic
activity.
15
A second TBTF benefit that the authorities may
perceive is that bailing out large bank creditors may
serve to protect their careers.
16 Instead of evaluating
the benefits and costs of using TBTF from society’s
overall perspective, the authorities calculate from a
personal perspective. Having large banks fail on
their watch is not something that most authorities
welcome. Indeed,  TBTF bailouts are usually well
received, especially by the creditors but also by the
general public, because the authorities always
emphasize the avoidance of looming short-run
“disasters” and ignore the longer-run costs.
17
Further, the authorities can look like heroes by
implementing TBTF policies even if their previous
actions or inactions were among the causes of the
financial instability. It is an unfortunate fact that in
most countries attempts by the authorities to take
action to prevent potential problems are usually
met with wide resistance, both by those directly
affected by such action and by society in general
where it is often seen as unwarranted government
intrusion in the market. Better to push the problem
off into the future and leave it for others to deal
with, or wait until the problem materializes and
come to the rescue with a TBTF policy.
18
Worse, when the authorities’ deliberately decide
to not take any or sufficiently strong action to deal
with a failing large bank (a practice referred to as
forbearance), it is often seen as banking authorities
doing their job well, since a failure has been
prevented. But forbearance usually just makes the
problem bigger, both in terms of the uncertainty of
the consequences a large bank failure and in terms
of the costs needed to deal with the problem. As a
result, TBTF will almost inevitably be used when
banking supervisors forbear. Finally, unlike central
bankers and the implementation of monetary
policy, there is no tradition of bank supervisors
“removing the punch bowl just as the party gets
going.” That is, bank supervisors typically do not
step in and interfere with profitable bank activities
that could lead to future problems.
While the failure of a large bank undoubtedly
has the potential for considerable negative spillover
effects, the authorities rarely quantify these effects.
Some observers argue that the TBTF benefits are
significantly overstated even with very large bank
failures. Nevertheless, the authorities know that
they will gain more support for TBTF by
suggesting that these contagion costs are very large.
There is always considerable uncertainty about the
consequences of allowing a large bank to fail, and
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
15 The bailout of creditors can have two dimensions. First, creditors of large banks can be protected from credit risk, that is, the risk of loss of
the principal amounts they have lent to a large bank. Second, they can be protected from liquidity risk, since even if they were to recover
most of their lent funds via a bankruptcy proceeding, they probably would not see these funds for a number years.
16 See Kane (2000).
17 A classic demonstration of this strategy occurred in the selling of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in the US. To pressure Congress
into providing $700 billion to fund TARP, the President, the Fed Chairman and the Treasury Secretary told Congress and the public that the
financial system was about to collapse and that the economy was on the verge of something worse than the Great Depression. They offered
little information as to how the $700 billion would be spent or who would benefit. See Cochrane 2009.
18 Kane (2009a) notes that “blame avoidance is a primary objective of bureaucrats.” Furthermore, there may be legislative or political barriers
inhibiting the ability of supervisors to take preventive actions.this uncertainty leads the authorities to see very
large benefits in avoiding spillover effects. It is hard
to do counterfactuals in these situations, and the
authorities have no incentives to do them.
19,20 
When applying TBTF, the authorities typically
point only to the short-run benefits. They rarely, if
ever, make statements indicating that the
application of TBTF will make the financial system
more stable and efficient in the longer run. There
are three possibilities to explain this phenomenon.
First, in a time of financial turbulence the
authorities are usually focused solely on short-run
concerns and ignore longer-run implications.
Second, the authorities might realize that they are
making the financial system less stable and less
efficient in the longer run, but feel that they have
no choice, or that they can deal with these longer-
term problems at some future date.
21 Finally, it
could be that the authorities believe that TBTF 
will not cause the financial system to become less
stable and efficient. Whatever the reason, as will be
seen below, the longer-run implications of applying
TBTF are very important and, if considered, might
serve to reduce its ready acceptance. 
Given these powerful incentives, it is thus not
surprising that TBTF policies are applied in periods
of financial turmoil. Publicly guaranteeing creditors
against loss at a single large bank sends a signal to
creditors at all large banks that they too will be
protected and have far less reason to run from their
bank. In addition, it allows governments to avoid
the disruptions that would occur if a large bank
were liquidated through bankruptcy proceedings.
What is usually lost in the application of TBTF is
any serious discussion of whether the benefits as
perceived by the authorities do in fact outweigh the
large financial and other economic costs of
employing TBTF. The next section discusses these
costs.
Costs 
The costs associated with a TBTF policy can be
seen as short- and longer-run. The short-run costs
are the obvious ones that come with a bailout of
uninsured creditors-taxpayers’ money is used or
committed to protect creditors from the losses they
would have incurred had the large bank failed and
in some cases to acquire equity positions in
impaired banks to allow their continued operation.
Even if the government does not provide bailout
funds to a bank, the existence of an implicit
guarantee or supervisory forbearance means
resources are transferred to bank shareholders and
creditors at the expense of taxpayers, since the latter
are not compensated for the guarantee they provide
to the former. In effect, bailouts represent a transfer
of wealth from taxpayers to creditors and others. 
Longer-run TBTF economic costs are not easy to
quantify. They relate to the perverse incentives
created by the use of  TBTF that jeopardize safety
and efficiency in the financial system. Expectations
by financial system participants of TBTF policies
are costly because they waste resources by
supporting the activities of a failing bank and hence
lower society’s overall well-being. And while the
transfer of funds from taxpayers to creditors creates
some “winners" (i.e., the creditors), wasted or
misallocated resources benefit no one and these
losses could substantially exceed the fiscal costs of a
bailout. 
For example, Feldman and Stern (2009) report
that the short-run fiscal cost incurred by the US
government in the 1980s bailout of the savings and
loans was approximately US$150 billion. They also
note that the US Congressional Budget Office
estimated that the lost output from the bailout,
largely resulting from poor resource allocation and
the realization of moral hazard, was a further 
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19 There are two reasons for this. In the midst of a crisis, there is no time to figure out what the negative consequences of allowing a large bank
to fail might be. After the crisis, the authorities will not relish the notion of supporting research that might conclude that their actions were
based on false premises.
20 Kane (2009a) is quite blunt about this. He states that during the recent financial turmoil, US “safety-net officials chose a sequence of chaotic,
present-obsessed behaviours and sought to justify the chaos by misframing what was a spreading insolvency crisis as a shortage of liquidity
and by whipping up unreasonable fears of an impending financial meltdown.” He further notes that the Federal Reserve, while expressing
distaste for bailing out giant firms, has yet to produce a public detailed analysis of the costs and benefits of each bailout in which it
participated.
21 Consider the proliferation of suggestions for reforming all or parts of the financial system that have flowed out of the recent period of
financial turbulence.US$500 billion, or more than three times the
amount of the short-run cost. These longer-run
costs were never raised by the authorities as they
dealt with what they perceived to be a major
financial crisis.
There are other important, but difficult-to-
quantify, longer-run costs. For example, the
existence or expectation of a government guarantee,
explicit or implicit, significantly reduces and, in
some cases, totally short-circuits the application of
market discipline to large banks. Creditors who
might otherwise not lend to a risky institution or, at
the very least, would charge a higher rate of interest,
shorten the term of their lending or demand
collateral as compensation for the risk to which
they are exposed, will see no need to do so if they
believe that governments will bail them out.  TBTF
reduces the incentives for individual banks to make
the best decisions they can about risks and rewards
and encourages banks to seek high-profit high-risk
activities because they do not have to worry about
the application of market discipline by creditors.
In the absence of such a guarantee, banks would
have to follow strategies that would assure creditors
that they would be repaid and that there was no
need to “run” on the bank. Such strategies would
include elements such as a well-diversified loan
portfolio, a sound risk assessment capability that
would build reputational capital over time and
holding capital and liquidity commensurate with
the riskiness of their activities. All of these actions
would help make the financial system safer and
reduce the likelihood of bank failures. In other
words, incentives for the private-sector financial
system participants would be aligned with the
objectives of public policy, namely the achievement
of a stable and efficient financial system.
The absence of market discipline is particularly
dangerous when a large bank is in a weakened
financial condition. If the amount of equity
remaining in a large bank is relatively small,
management and shareholders lose their incentives
to limit the bank’s riskiness. Indeed, they may adopt
very risky strategies to try to rebuild the bank’s equity
because they have little to lose if the bank were to 
fail-the practice is sometimes referred to as “gambling
for resurrection.” 
In the absence of a government guarantee, creditors
might be counted on to apply discipline to limit such
a bank’s riskiness. In such a situation, the bank would
have to change its strategy and might even search for
a merger partner or wind up its activities in a
controlled fashion. However, the expectation of a
government guarantee impairs such incentives. Thus,
the weakened bank is allowed to continue borrowing
funds and grow even though its excessively risky
activities are likely to result in insolvency. 
TBTF also results in significant misallocations 
of resources. TBTF results in inefficient credit
decisions being made, leading to the financing of
projects that are relatively too risky from society’s
perspective. TBTF blunts the effect of competition,
allowing banks that are cost inefficient to continue
operating rather than being driven from the market.
In the same vein, TBTF-supported banks have less
incentive to innovate, since the absence of
competition reduces the need to do so. 
As well, TBTF tends to lead banks to adopt similar
risk-management strategies (i.e., herd behaviour)
because they realize that if they all get in trouble from
being exposed to the same source of risk, the
probability of the authorities using TBTF is higher
than if a single large bank got  into difficulties.
Furthermore, TBTF can induce an inflationary bias
into monetary policy as the authorities strive to
prevent large banks from failing by keeping interest
rates too low or credit conditions too easy. It can also
result in perceptions that monetary policy will
Commentary 311 | 7
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support certain markets to avoid a decline in prices
that could lead to an economic downturn.
22
Finally, after TBTF has been used to deal with a
financial problem, government may belatedly realize
the moral hazard associated with its actions and seek
ways to try to limit moral-hazard costs. These
attempts are often misguided because they fail to
directly address the use of TBTF and often lead to the
adoption of policies that create further inefficiencies.
Such activities can also waste scarce analytical and
supervisory resources in the pursuit of misdirected
policy reforms.
The misallocation of resources occurs not just at
the bank, but also across the banking system. Since
the TBTF policy will be perceived as applying to all
large banks, governments often raise the size of their
explicit guarantees as well, usually by raising the size
of deposits covered by deposit-insurance schemes.
This is often seen as a means of helping smaller and
medium-size banks. Since depositors insured under
the deposit insurance scheme have little incentive to
monitor risk at these institutions, those banks to
which the TBTF is thought not to apply are able to
raise funds at lower rates and in greater quantities
than would otherwise be the case.
23
TBTF is Becoming more Pervasive
The expectation that TBTF will be used by the
authorities to deal with financially troubled banks has
become so pervasive and generally accepted that it is
now incorporated into the ratings of banks by credit
rating agencies. These agencies attempt to assess the
likelihood that issuers of debt will make full and
timely repayment of their obligations.
24 A significant
number of banks rated by these agencies are judged to
have potential solvency problems, yet these banks’
deposit ratings are rated above “investment grade.”
The message to prospective depositors is that a bank
which has solvency problems is still an acceptable
issuer of deposits because the rating agency believes
that there is a high likelihood of government
support for creditors should the bank’s solvency be
threatened.
The credit rating agencies’ ratings of banks and
other entities have increasingly become relied upon
by legislators (e.g., allowing pension funds or
insurance companies to buy only investment grade
securities), government supervisors of financial
institutions (e.g., in establishing the Basel II
minimum capital standards), and central banks
(e.g., in determining the acceptability and collateral
value of securities for lender of last resort loans or
repo transactions). The extensive and increasing use
by governments and their agents of the ratings
provided by credit rating agencies suggests that they
attach significant weight to the information
provided by such ratings, which implicitly includes
the methodologies used by the agencies to derive
their ratings.
25 The silence from governments and
their agencies regarding the incorporation of TBTF
into the ratings of banks has probably served to
reinforce the expectation of TBTF in the minds of
creditors and management of large banks, and
possibly even in the minds of the authorities
themselves, resulting in an increased likelihood of 
22 See Taylor 2007 and Miller, Weller and Zhang 2001.
23 Both Canada and the US have formal deposit insurance schemes that protect depositors for amounts up $100K and $250K per eligible
deposit. The US authorities, as part of their response to the recent financial turmoil, raised the coverage of deposit insurance from $100K 
to $250K until December 2013, when coverage is scheduled to revert to $100K. However, government guarantees once provided are very
difficult to rescind.
24 Credit rating agencies typically use an alpha-numeric scale to characterize the likelihood of a debt issuer repaying its debt. Debt that meets a
certain minimum likelihood of repayment is classified as “investment grade.” Achieving such a designation is a major objective of debt
issuers since without it the pool of potential buyers is severely limited. Purchasers of debt also may want higher ratings as this increases the
range of     assets they can buy as they attempt to increase overall portfolio yields. This factor played a significant role in the recent period of
financial turmoil.
25 Note that this is not a universally held view. Many commentators have questioned the usefulness of credit agency ratings, citing flawed
methodologies, questionable marketing practices of their services, conflicts of interest within the rating agencies, and the oligopolistic nature
of the market, among other things. See World Bank (Katz, Salinas, and Stephanou), Crisis Response, Note 8, Credit Rating Agencies for a
discussion of the role of rating agencies in the recent financial turmoil. Commentary 311 | 9
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TBTF being the tool of choice when dealing with
failing large banks.
26
As was demonstrated during the recent financial
turmoil, the more often TBTF policies are resorted
to, the more likely that banks and their creditors,
credit-rating agencies and probably even the
authorities will believe that they will be used in the
future, even though the same authorities may claim
that each TBTF usage is the “last time.” Not only
does the use of TBTF for large banks increase the
likelihood of future large-bank TBTF actions, the
TBTF model has spread to other areas in the
economy during the past few decades. It has been
applied to smaller banks (e.g., Canadian
Commercial Bank and Northland Bank in Canada,
Northern Rock in England and many small US
banks), to insurance companies (e.g., AIG in the
United States), non-financial corporations 
(e.g., Chrysler, twice in the United States, and GM
in both the United States and Canada), real estate
markets in Japan, investment bankers (mostly in
the United States) and hedge funds (e.g., Long-
Term Capital Management [LTCM] in the United
States). Often these TBTF actions for non-bank
entities were aimed at assisting large banks.
It should also be noted that TBTF policies 
for banks easily spread across borders. The use 
of TBTF in one country helps to legitimize its use
in others, particularly when the country that has
resorted to TBTF most often is the United States,
which has a very large and sophisticated financial
system.
Three relatively recent developments have
strengthened the belief that TBTF will be used to
resolve problem banks. The first development
relates to the increasing concentration of assets held
by banks. In most countries there has been an
increase in the concentration of banking assets in
fewer, really large banks. Larger banks, all other
things equal, will reinforce creditors’ expectations of
TBTF being used if a large bank fails. Fewer really
large banks are also likely to lead to greater
interdependencies in certain markets, which again
will reinforce expectations of TBTF policy
action.
27,28 Finally, in many countries creditors are
more likely to believe that there are now more
banks that may meet the threshold for TBTF,
particularly since governments have used TBTF
policies to resolve banks in the past that were
inconsequential from a size or uniqueness
perspective.
The second development is the increased use of
technology which has permitted large banks to play
a dominant role in payments, securities and foreign
exchange transactions. In addition, technology has
facilitated the development of new, sophisticated,
and complicated activities and risk strategies at
large banks, and has generally made large banks
more complex.
29 Technological developments have
increased substantially banks’ involvement in
capital markets-using them as a funding source, as
suppliers of new financial instruments, as buyers of
these instruments, and sometimes as market
makers-over the past 15 years. Bank supervisors
have had an increasingly difficult time evaluating
the potential risks and spillovers associated with
banks’ use of new instruments and new risk
management strategies. Increasingly complex large
26 One exception is Canada’s Superintendent of Financial Institutions who has expressed strong concern about the behaviour of rating
agencies to increasingly rely on the presumption of government support for large banks in arriving at their ratings of large bank debt and
further embed these expectations (Dickson 2009).
27 The increase in the concentration of bank assets in part reflects efficiency gains at US banks as they have moved to overcome the
dysfunctional segmentation that had historically been imposed on them. Banking in Europe has also become more concentrated as barriers
to entry within the E.U. have declined and banks move to a larger and more efficient size. Nevertheless, some of the increased
concentration in banking assets reflects the belief in the existence of a TBTF policy as banks take advantage of the unpriced subsidy
inherent in TBTF.
28 This issue was raised in the Group of Ten (2001) study of Large Complex Banking Organizations (LCBOs).
29 Herring (2009a) notes that one of the most complex financial firms controls 2,435 subsidiaries, half of which are chartered in other
countries, largely to minimize regulatory burdens or taxes.banks will make the authorities more uncertain
about the consequences of letting a large bank fail
and will reinforce the authorities’ tendency to resort
to TBTF.
30
The third development is that an increasing use
of TBTF to resolve large banks in financial
difficulties has likely led to greater expectations of
TBTF being applied in the future. All of these
factors make it more likely that TBTF will be
resorted to deal with financial difficulties at large
banks
TBTF for Markets? 
More recently, there have been proposals to apply
TBTF-type policies to certain financial markets.
Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney has noted
that “the crisis was clearly exacerbated by the seizure
of interbank and repo markets.” In a May 2008
speech, Carney proposed that the Bank become the
“market maker of last resort” and “adapt central
bank liquidity facilities as necessary” to deal with the
issue. He suggested that central banks should be
able to directly support “liquidity in a wider range
of markets when appropriate (Carney May 2008a).”
However, there are a number of potential
problems with this proposal. Perhaps the most
fundamental issue is that liquidity was not the
critical problem in many markets. While
transaction volumes were much less during the
recent financial turmoil than in normal
circumstances, solvency problems, not liquidity
issues, were the primary causes of these sharply
reduced levels of activity. 
The solvency issues arose from two sources. 
First, in markets where the instruments depended
on models for their valuation, the values of these
instruments declined rapidly when participants
realized the values were based on unrealistic
assumptions. Second, once the values of these
instruments were significantly marked down,
concerns developed about the solvency of those
entities that were thought to hold sizable amounts
of these instruments. In addition, the liquidity of
these markets dried up as most participants tried to
sell their holdings of questionable assets. 
In addition, participants in markets for other
instruments became extremely cautious in dealing
with counterparties because of concerns about their
solvency. These markets were not going to return to
normal until market prices of overvalued
instruments reached more realistic levels and until
counterparty solvency concerns were satisfied. No
amount of liquidity from the central bank was
going to resolve these problems. As noted by
Herring (2009a) and Kane (2009a), central banks
have learned that they have a limited ability to
substitute central bank liquidity for endogenous
liquidity created by the financial system.  Just as
central bank lender-of-last-resort liquidity
operations cannot deal with bank solvency
problems, neither can central bank liquidity
operations deal with solvency-type issues in
financial markets.
Markets react to financial turmoil by adding
significant risk premiums to prices. In addition, a
liquidity premium in interbank and repo markets
often develops as demand for liquidity increases
and supply becomes more limited. The uncertainty
regarding the financial health of some or all
participants often results in a significantly reduced
flow of funds between borrowers and lenders.
31  But
markets do not disappear entirely, and they will
recover, particularly if central banks are pushing
liquidity through commercial banks via lender-of-
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30 Kane (2009a) argues that changes in risk-taking technology have outstripped what he calls the social controls on the job performance of
private and public officials responsible for managing a country’s safety net. Every country’s safety net offers non-transparent (and often
implicit) subsidies to institutions. The availability of these unmeasured and unacknowledged subsidies undermines financial stability by
encouraging financial institutions to take on risk in innovative ways whose safety-net implications are not immediately recognized by those
officials responsible for the safety net. Kane proposes that to avoid the use of TBTF in future, incentives must be devised for these officials to
recognize and control these implications in a timely manner.
31 It should be noted that financial stability is not the absence of volatility or sharp adjustments in financial prices and quantities as markets
adjust to shocks. Volatility or sharp adjustments can be an important part of price discovery or quantity adjustment in a sound financial
system (Freedman and Goodlet 2007). These authors also warned about the dangers of central banks becoming too interventionist in pursuit
of financial stability, possibly resulting in the creation of conditions supportive of excessively risky behaviour in private markets.Commentary 311 | 11
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last-resort operations to compensate for the lack of
activity in the interbank and repo markets.
32 
By becoming a market maker of last resort,
central banks could be seen as implementing a
TBTF type of policy, validating the unreasonable
assumptions many market participants had built
into their trading or borrowing operations. These
assumptions regarding the ease of liquidating
positions or borrowing funds caused considerable
difficulties when the value of certain instruments
and the solvency of many financial firms began to
be questioned.  With central bank assurances of
liquidity, market participants will devote fewer
resources to managing their liquidity needs, and
risks will again have been moved to the public
sector. In addition, participants in other markets
may cite these arrangements in lobbying for public
support should their markets become disrupted. 
If market participants lose their fear of failure, or
market discipline, they will take ever larger risks
and require ever larger bailouts. In addition, central
bank intervention as a market maker of last resort is
likely to slow the adjustment process. What market
participants need to take away from recent events is
that their assumptions regarding asset values and
market liquidity were wrong and that more
sophisticated modelling of asset values and liquidity
is necessary.
33 However, if central banks now
indicate that they will become market makers of
last resort, they may slow this process and may even
short circuit it as market participants come to
assume that the central bank will bail them out by
intervening in tough times.
34
Another potential problem is related to the desire
for greater disclosure of information of financial
market activities, a policy being promoted by the
G20. If central banks were to act as market makers
it would reduce the incentives for greater disclosure
because central banks may be perceived as always
being there to bail out troubled institutions and
markets should expectations regarding the value
and market liquidity of a particular set of
instruments not be borne out. Greater disclosure
will only come about if private market participants
conclude that it is necessary for a market to
function more effectively, not because the
authorities think it is a good idea. 
Finally, being a market maker of last resort could
result in the central bank acquiring debt issued by
the private sector. For reasons that go beyond the
scope of this Commentary, this is probably a poor
idea, largely because it places the central bank in a
position where it is making direct loans to the non-
financial sector and also because it would be forced
to value such securities by making judgments
regarding the business prospects, repayment
capacity and the future solvency of the issuer. The
central bank has no comparative advantage in
becoming a direct supplier of credit to the private
sector and arguably is less able to make such
judgments than other market participants.
35
32 While market volumes and prices were significantly altered during the financial turmoil, this is not the same as saying that markets did
not operate, as some authorities said during the recent period of financial turmoil. It was easier to sell TBTF-type policies by stating
that markets had "seized up", were "frozen", or were no longer functioning. The market would appear to be operating in circumstances
where either a seller or buyer of an asset cannot make credible the value of the asset or his ability to pay, or reduces his level of activity
because of uncertainty about how financial turmoil will be resolved or because of concerns about the solvency of potential
counterparties.
33 Governor Carney has noted that markets made a mistake in assuming markets would always remain liquid and that this assumption
encouraged the rapid growth of the "originate-to-distribute" model.
34 The Bank of Canada has made this point itself, noting that central bank intervention could "discourage financial market participants
from managing counterparty risk appropriately with attendant adverse effects on the functioning of the financial system. As well,
central bank intervention can create incentives for institutions to generate the conditions that would trigger such intervention so that
they can benefit. In sum, whenever a central bank intervenes, there are costs and intervention creates the potential for moral hazard. To
the extent that private agents expect a central bank to provide liquidity whenever financial markets encounter difficulties, private agents
will take less care in managing their liquidity and counterparty risks, which could make markets work less well in the future.” (Engert,
Selody, and Wilkins, 2008)
35 See Broaddus and Goodfriend (2001). | 12 Commentary 311
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In addition, the prices to be used by the central
bank to transact in non-government securities may
be problematic since there may be a strong
temptation to use evaluations that will assist private
market participants avoid recognizing losses on
their balance sheets. During the 2007 non-bank
issued asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP)
problem in Canada, some holders of this
instrument were hoping government agencies
would take the paper off their hands at close to
what they paid for it as a means of avoiding the
immediate recognition of losses. 
The Canadian non-bank ABCP difficulties
demonstrate how central banks can be tempted to
intervene in markets. In August 2007, the Bank of
Canada, in response to problems in this market,
expanded the range of eligible instruments for its
Special Purchase and Resale facility to include those
issued by the private sector. (Previously, only risk-
free Government of Canada securities had been
used in these transactions.) The non-bank ABCP
problem was not a serious threat to the financial
system, although some individual participants had
taken on sizable exposures of this instrument.
Nevertheless, the Bank felt compelled to take this
action.
36,37This action likely reinforced the
impression that the Bank would intervene and bail
institutions and markets out of their liquidity
difficulties should the need arise in the future.
38
Still, the central bank should be able to help
markets function better in times of stress. Carney
has noted that the development of clearing houses
for some markets with standardized products would
help. If well-designed, then this step would be quite
useful in dealing with potential contagion effects.
39
In this type of arrangement, the central bank might
serve as a lender of last resort to the clearing house,
lending on good collateral in the event that a
participant in the arrangement is unable to meet its
payment obligations. But this is a far different type
of involvement than being a market maker of last
resort.
Clearly, the performance of markets will be
different in times of financial turmoil than in
normal times. Risk and liquidity premiums will
increase, counterparty solvency concerns will arise,
the volume of funds flowing through markets will
likely be reduced and prices will likely be quite
volatile. And there is no question that these changes
will affect the allocation of resources, the
distribution of risk and, potentially, overall
economic performance. However, this is not the
central issue. What should be of greater concern is
whether a TBTF intervention will cause even
greater problems in the long run. It is this central
question that should serve as the guiding principle
to any proposals to change the nature of the
involvement of public authorities in the
functioning of markets.
To Summarize
While the application of TBTF is intended to
create stability in the financial system by protecting
the creditors of large banks and, hence, the banks
themselves, it in fact creates incentives for too
much future risk taking that will destabilize the
financial system. Creditors will fail to supply
adequate market discipline to banks because they
36  Unfortunately the Bank did not have the legal authority under its Act to acquire such instruments and the facility was terminated in mid-
September. The Bank of Canada Act was subsequently amended to permit the Bank of Canada to acquire private-sector securities subject to
certain, fairly strict, conditions. There was little or no public discussion of this change, as the changes to the Bank of Canada Act were
"buried" in federal government budget legislation.  
37  Note that the Bank of Canada was not the only central bank pushing its powers beyond what was appropriate or legal during the financial
turmoil. Paul Volcker commented following the Fed-financed merger of Bear Stearns and JPMorgan Chase, “The Federal Reserve has judged
it necessary to take actions that extend to the very edge of its lawful and implied powers, transcending in the process certain long-embedded
central banking principles and practices.” He also noted that the Fed`s actions “will surely be interpreted as an implied promise of similar
action in times of future turmoil.” (Volcker 2008).
38  Again, Freedman and Goodlet (2007) cautioned, "while it may appear appropriate on the surface for central banks to intervene in specific
markets or with specific market participants, there are very serious moral hazards in this context".
39 Although such a development could well limit the ability of market participants to net positions in various market instruments, as not all
instruments would be eligible for settlement in clearing houses.Commentary 311 | 13
believe that governments will protect them from
losses in the event that the bank to which they have
lent funds becomes financially non-viable. With
TBTF, bailouts go to those who engage in what
would normally be regarded as reckless and
incompetent behaviour. However, in a TBTF world
such behaviour is perfectly rational as banks,
creditors and others seek to exploit the gains offered
by TBTF. The increasing use of bailouts, even
though they have large negative consequences, also
has the perverse effect of making future bailouts
more tolerable and, thus, more likely.
40
In short, bailouts reward failure and penalize
success, dull competition, which reduces efficiency
and innovation, are unfair to ailing companies’
competitors and their shareholders who are not
using taxpayers’ money to stay in business and draw
government more deeply into the affairs of private
business. TBTF sets up an asymmetric game-when
things are going well, banks stress the benefits of
unconstrained markets free from government
regulation, but when things go badly, these same
banks will stress the supposedly dire consequences
of their failure and seek government bailouts. In
other words, profits are privatized and risks are
socialized. 
If bailouts are not immediately forthcoming
during financial turmoil, political pressure usually
results in TBTF policies because the authorities
have not prepared an alternative, and they greatly
fear the uncertain consequences of not bailing out
troubled entities. A lack of direct action is likely to
leave the authorities open to criticism, even if the
appropriate policy is to do nothing.  
It has been noted (Aliber 2005; Caprio and
Klingebiel 2003; Freedman and Goodlet 2007) that
the past few decades have been among the most
financially unstable in modern history.
41 Not only
has the magnitude of the problems increased, but
so has the speed with which they develop. Some of
this is undoubtedly due to advances in technology,
new trading strategies and new entrants into the
financial system. TBTF has also played a significant
role in the increasing frequency and size of periods
of financial instability by creating inappropriate
incentives for financial system participants to take
on too much risk, which in turn leads government
to absorb these risks through TBTF. 
How pervasive has TBTF become? Professor
Charles Goodhart notes:
“The new reality, post the Lehman failure, is 
that the public sector, the State, has become 
the ultimate guarantor of both the liquidity 
and the continued viability (solvency) of 
all systemic parts of the financial sector.”
“Under pressure of recent events, this 
latter paradigm [Bagehot’s lender of last
resort prescription] has been abandoned in
favour of broader insurance of the liquidity
and solvency of all ‘systemic’ financial
institutions. Liquidity assistance has been
provided to an ever-widening range of
financial intermediaries, on ever more
dubious collateral, for ever-lengthening
durations. Similarly, apart from equity
holders, most bank creditors have been
guaranteed" (Goodhart (2010).
Addressing the TBTF Problem
The Context and Basic Outline of Policy Reform
Once TBTF has been applied and the short-run
crisis dealt with, the authorities belatedly 
begin to consider the moral hazard implications 
of their actions. In the aftermath to the recent
financial turmoil, there has been an avalanche of
reform proposals, including the creation of banks
with very limited powers or limits on their size,
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40 Edwin Truman (2009) notes "the impacts on the behaviour of institutions that are not allowed to fail, or the behaviour of their management, 
are more important than the issue of the cost of bailouts and who bears those costs".
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increasing the intrusiveness of banking 
supervision, identifying which banks (or markets)
are systemically important and the addition of
macro-financial stability to the mandate of central
banks.
42 The risk involved in this process is that
most of these proposals are likely to lead to a less
stable and a less efficient financial system because
they ignore a fundamental problem-the impact of
the use of TBTF when dealing with banks facing
solvency problems. 
Instead, we need a four-step strategy to 
stabilize the financial system:
￿ First, the authorities should recognize that
they have relied excessively on TBTF when
dealing with problem banks and other
financial and non-financial entities.
￿ Second, they must recognize they are “hooked
on” TBTF as the current policy of choice
despite the fact that it produces significant
moral hazard, generates more costs than benefits
and is likely to result in more frequent and more
severe financial problems in the future. 
￿ Third, ways need to be found to reduce the
likelihood of TBTF being used, whether by 
lowering the likelihood of large bank failures 
or finding alternatives to help resolve
financially troubled large banks.
￿ Finally, one must acknowledge that there 
are rare circumstances in which TBTF 
may be the only appropriate policy response. 
Canada’s Superintendent of Financial Institutions
Julie Dickson has set out a useful context for
considering the various reform proposals (Dickson
2009). She notes that Canada, like most other
countries, has a constrained market economy.
Societies choose this type of arrangement because
they recognize that many of the issues related to
financial system instability derive from externalities
and unaddressed interdependencies among private
sector agents which require some public sector
intervention. However, society also does not want a
centrally-planned economy because it values the
discipline that markets can impose on participants.
Banks (and others) will have to succeed on their
own merits in a competitive market. She notes that
any action taken (or not taken) by the authorities
can create incentives for certain types of behaviour.
As a result, the authorities should try to create
incentives that align private-sector behaviour with
society’s objectives and avoid the creation of
incentives that are incompatible with these
objectives.
Dickson says the highest priority for regulatory
reform should be the reassertion of market
discipline, by which she means ending the
“continuation of deeply embedded expectations of
implicit or explicit support of financial institutions
by government.”
Dickson has identified the most fundamental
issue facing authorities with regard to the financial
sector: TBTF creates incentives for private-sector
financial market participants to take on too much
risk because it blunts the operation of market
discipline. The failure to acknowledge this problem
and devote serious resources to it will lead to
financial systems continuing to be much less stable
and efficient than they could be.
Policy changes to reduce the reliance on TBTF 
There are three types of policy changes that will
reduce reliance on TBTF: (a) policies that reduce
the probability of large banks failing (preventive
policies); (b) policies that will resolve financially
troubled large banks without the use of TBTF
(remedial policies); and (c) resisting the temptation
to adopt so-called reforms that do not confront the
TBTF problem.
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Reducing the Probability of Large Bank Failures
Policies that reduce the probability of large 
bank failures constitute the preventive, or ex ante,
component of bank regulation and supervision.
Such policies are intended to create or reinforce
incentives for all regulated banks to engage in
behaviour that will achieve the public-policy goals
of a stable and efficient financial system. In other
words, they are intended to re-establish market
discipline and strengthen supervisory control of
large banks.
One interesting proposal involves contingent
capital. This approach would force the conversion
of lower-quality capital and certain types of debt
into higher quality capital when pre-specified
triggers are tripped. The notion is that if a large
bank impairs its capital in some pre-specified way
or fails to increase its capital in response to
increased risk, holders of lower-quality capital and
some forms of its debt would have their claims
converted to higher-quality capital, which would be
available to absorb losses in an unconstrained
fashion while the bank continues operations.
43
This would reinforce market discipline in two
ways: first, existing holders of higher-quality capital
would likely be averse to having their positions
diluted should a trigger be tripped and thus will
monitor management’s actions to avoid such an
outcome. Second, by being able to force
conversions to higher-quality capital, holders of
lower-quality capital and of straight debt issued by
the bank could no longer assume they would
benefit from any TBTF action, since they would be
converted from creditors to true equity holders.
This would also likely increase market discipline by
directly addressing the expectation of some
creditors that governments would make them
whole in the event of a large bank facing financial
difficulties.
Closely linked to this proposal is the need to
revisit the authorities’ “early intervention/early
resolution” arrangements. The effectiveness of a
contingent capital approach rests on putting a floor
beneath the discretionary action a supervisor can
take in dealing with a capital-deficient bank, as well
as putting in place sound bank supervisory
accountability mechanisms. The triggers for action
must be clearly defined, largely outside the ability
of a bank to manipulate, able to measure the
current risk profile of the bank, relatively easy to
observe and calculate, and set to trigger supervisory
action while a bank still has a significant amount of
capital but is below its required minimum. 
Establishing such a regime is challenging since
the measurement of these triggers raises serious
accounting issues. For example, asset and liability
values based on historical cost seriously misstates a
bank’s capital-current cost accounting, even with its
issues, would do a much better job. If a bank,
holders of its contingent capital instruments and
the bank’s supervisor know that that the supervisor
will be compelled to force the conversion of
contingent capital when a clearly-defined trigger is
tripped, all three parties will have strong incentives
to avoid this situation. Contingent capital holders
will seek to discipline the bank. The banks will take
strong actions first to avoid approaching the trigger
level and second to raise new capital quickly to
avoid existing shareholder dilution if it does
approach the trigger level. Supervisors, wanting to
avoid any public conversion of contingent capital, 
will still have discretion in how to deal with a
problematic bank at capital levels above the 
trigger level and will have the incentives to do so.
The version of this mechanism proposed by the
Canadian Superintendent would see the conversion
of debt to common equity capital occurring when
the current and likely future condition of a bank
has led the Superintendent to inform the bank in
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writing that the bank has ceased (or will cease) to
be viable and the supervisor was ready to take
control. This approach leaves too much discretion
to the supervisor as to when the trigger for
contingent capital would be tripped. There are 
no clear and pre-specified measures as to when 
the Superintendent will trip the trigger and force
conversion of the contingent capital. This will
create uncertainty among existing bank
management, shareholders and debt holders and
make their actions less certain. Rather, the trigger
event needs to be more concrete and pre-specified
in law. A second concern with the Superintendent’s
proposal is that the trigger is likely to be tripped
when capital levels are very low, which means that
the amount of contingent capital needed to restore
the bank to its minimum required level will be
much larger than if the trigger is set just below the
minimum required level of capital.
44 Tripping the
trigger when capital was just below the required
minimum would encourage shareholders to raise
additional capital (if they believe their bank has a
viable future) in amounts that won’t be too large
and at a price that won’t be too expensive. If they
choose not to raise additional capital at this point,
the supervisor would have a clear statement from
the shareholders as to what they think their bank is
worth. In addition, triggering the conversion when
capital is well below the required minimum would
encourage debt holders who may be facing
conversion into equity to take short positions in the
bank’s equity, driving the price of the equity down
in the hopes of gaining more equity when their
debt is converted and may also encourage the bank
to take highly risky actions in an attempt to realize
short-term profits and rebuild its equity. 
45
A final concern surrounds the resolution of a
problematic bank in the event that the recapitalized
bank fails. Clear and credible resolution procedures
are needed. In Canada, this means that the powers
available to the Superintendent and CDIC (e.g.,
with its bridge bank and financial institution
restructuring programme powers)  have to be
shown as sufficient to deal with a large bank failure.
In addition, the government will need to make
credible commitments that it will not provide
guarantees, assurance programmes or other types 
of bailouts, such as asset purchase programs. 
A second way of reducing the probability of bank
failures involves penalties, either financial in the
form of a tax or non-financial in the form of
activity constraints, when an institution’s capital,
liquidity or profit margins decrease and its leverage
increases. Under this proposal, it may be possible to
regulate and supervise a wider array of financial
institutions by providing the necessary incentives
for banks and their creditors to reduce the riskiness
of large bank activities (Goodhart 2009). 
A third set of preventive policies would reduce
the interconnectedness of large banks. The most
obvious source of contagion is the payments
system, or other clearing and settlement systems
that handle securities transactions or foreign
exchange transactions. In this regard, Canada is
well situated since the Bank of Canada has
identified all payment and other clearing and
settlement systems that have the potential to
generate systemic risk and has designated them 
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44  It should be noted that OSFI has procedures and powers to compel recapitalization of a bank whose capital falls below minimum
requirements that could be used before any trigger for contingent capital was tripped. Making the trigger event more concrete and setting it
to occur at a higher level of capital than proposed by the Superintendent would not deny the Superintendent the ability to exercise these
powers. As noted above, it would just force the Superintendent to exercise her discretion when capital was just above or just below required
levels. 
45  The Superintendent’s proposal also contains a second trigger: if a bank has accepted or agreed to accept a capital injection from the
government. It is debatable whether this is really a separate trigger, since banks will want to do everything they can to avoid the stigma
attached to a public injection of capital (much as banks try very hard to avoid taking extended lender of last resort loans). A bank facing a
capital deficiency would turn to private sources to raise additional capital. If it was unable to raise sufficient capital from private sources to
meet its capital requirements, this would be a strong indicator of non-viability. Presumably a government injection of capital would only
occur after the bank had concluded that it was unable to raise capital from private sources. Thus, the trigger based on government injections
of capital may well be redundant since a bank concluding that it cannot raise capital from private sources to meet its capital deficiency would
surely be seen by the Superintendent as non-viable. Nevertheless this second trigger would also act as a barrier to governments resorting to
TBTF policies by providing banks with publicly funded injections of capital as there would now be direct consequences for the holders of
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for oversight by the Bank. Other countries with
sophisticated financial systems have taken 
similar steps. 
However, these systems are not the only 
sources of contagion. For example, there have 
been suggestions of developing clearing and
settlement arrangements for certain market
instruments such as repos or derivatives. The use 
of central counterparties and robust risk-proofing
techniques could significantly reduce counterparty
risk and again reduce the risk of spillovers. As well,
setting limits with regard to the size of exposures that
large banks could have to counterparties outside of
robust clearinghouse arrangements 
could also help.
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A fourth way of stabilizing banks is to introduce
much more realistic stress testing to reveal situations
that could cause considerable turbulence in the
financial sector. To date, stress testing and models
used by large banks have been woefully inadequate
because of their failure to consider the reactions of
other market participants and their belief that
markets would always be able to handle the
liquidation of their positions, regardless of size. This
is easier said than done because there is not a good
understanding of the linkages between the financial
and real sectors, behaviours and statistical
relationships change in time of turmoil, and it is very
difficult to incorporate feedback mechanisms and the
actions of the authorities. Any success in this area
will require a good deal of scarce resources to be
committed.
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Public authorities should also use stress tests to
examine the implications of heightened credit risks
faced by institutions, excessive leverage in various
parts of the financial system and operational risk
concentrations where individual institutions may
play a key role in important markets. In Canada, as
in other countries, some of this is being done by the
central bank in publications like the Bank of
Canada’s Financial System Review (Freedman and
Goodlet 2007). However, central bank financial
stability publications may find it difficult to draw
attention to poorly designed government policies
that will create instability in the financial system for
fear of damaging relationships with treasuries if they
are too forthright in their criticisms. In any event,
the analysis will not be taken seriously enough by the
private sector to result in behaviour change until the
reliance on TBTF policies is changed. 
Imbalances will occur in financial markets that
lead to turmoil. Often these imbalances are the result
of government fiscal and monetary policy choices,
exchange-rate policies, or the use of the tax system
and excessive government guarantees to promote
home ownership or other favoured sectors.
Inappropriate regulatory and supervisory regimes are
another cause. Governments and their agents need to
be much more focused on the impact of their own
policies on the stability and efficiency of the financial
system.
48
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46 The benefits of introducing clearinghouses can be overstated. Not all Over-The-Counter derivatives can be put into a clearinghouse
arrangement because some are too idiosyncratic and difficult to manage by a central counterparty. Second, settling some derivative
transactions in a clearinghouse, but not all, can inhibit bilateral netting and actually leave an entity with more risk, not less, on its books.
Third, in the case of derivatives, international cooperation, similar to that associated with CLS Bank, will be required to clear and settle these
transactions on a global basis.
47 See Alfaro and Drehmann (2009) for a good summary of the shortcomings of macro stress tests.
48 The importance of this last point is difficult to overstate. Calomiris (2009a) states that the origins of the recent financial problems in the US "were
not the result of random mass insanity; rather they reflected a policy environment that strongly encouraged financial managers to underestimate
risk in the subprime market. Risk taking was driven by government policies". He identifies four government errors in this regard: (i) lax Fed
monetary policy, especially from 2002 to 2005 that promoted easy credit and kept interest rates very low for a protracted period; (ii) numerous
government policies promoting the subprime mortgage market that included Congressional pressure on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to promote
“affordable housing”, lending subsidies from the Federal Home Loan Bank System to its members and FHA subsidies that promoted high
mortgage leverage and risk, government sponsored policies that reduced the costs to mortgage borrowers who failed to meet debt service
requirements, and “almost unbelievably” 2006 legislation that encouraged rating agencies to relax their standards for measuring risk in subprime
securitizations; (iii) government ownership policies that have made effective corporate governance within large banks virtually impossible; and, (iv)
ineffective government prudential regulation of banks that permitted banks to rely extensively on credit agencies’ assessments and internal bank
models to measure risk coupled with TBTF expectations that makes it difficult to enforce effective discipline on large banks even if supervisors
detect that the large banks have suffered large losses or built up imprudently large risks. Canada is vulnerable to all of these concerns. John Taylor
(2009) notes “government actions and interventions, not any inherent failure or instability of the private economy, caused, prolonged and
dramatically worsened the crisis.” | 18 Commentary 311
Strengthening financial supervision is another way
to prevent a banking crisis. More work needs to be
done to identify the behavioural norms and
incentive structures that have made supervision
weak in the first place and to recommend
accountability reforms that would be strong enough
to make tougher supervision compatible with a
supervisor’s self-interest (Kane 2009b and 2009c).
Finally among measures to reduce the probability
of bank failures, governments and their agencies
need to test all existing policies applied to, and
every policy proposed for, the financial sector
against the following questions: (i) will a policy,
regulation, etc., provide incentives for private-sector
financial-system participants to take actions that
will maintain or add to the stability and efficiency
of the financial system; (ii) will a policy increase or
decrease the probability that the authorities will use
TBTF to resolve a financial problem involving large
banks; and (iii) will a policy strengthen or weaken
the perception of private market participants that
TBTF will be used by the authorities to resolve a
large bank problem.
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Almost as important as stress testing and
contingency planning is the communication of
these activities. If the authorities are going to be
credible in convincing large bank creditors that
future reliance on TBTF is much less likely, they
must make their analysis and objectives much more
transparent. They must indicate where new
legislative authority is needed or where legislation
will be changed to facilitate contingency plans. By
setting out the planned responses to dealing with a
large bank problem, responses which do not
include TBTF, the authorities can gain much
needed credibility.  
Making the Failue of Large Banks more
Acceptable 
Proposals under this heading are intended to
address the authorities concerns about the
feasibility of resolving large failing banks without
the use of TBTF. These proposals represent the
remedial, or ex post, component of banking
regulation and supervision. Resolution of failing
banks can take a variety or forms−merger with
another institution, voluntary scaling back of
activities, including the voluntary winding up of
an institution, or the application of a special
bankruptcy regime to banks (i.e. involuntary
winding up of the bank). 
To reduce the authorities reliance on TBTF,
supervisors need to have a credible alternative to
guarantees and other TBTF instruments. The
better the policies to reduce the probability of 
large bank failures, the less likely that resolution
processes will be needed. But in the rare
circumstances when a bank does fail, good
resolution procedures will be absolutely critical.
They need to test these plans through the simulation
of a failure, examining the usefulness of various
resolution techniques (such as liquidation, sale of the
bank, the use of a bridge bank, forced recapitalization
as discussed above). These simulations should identify
the information needed by the authorities and
supervisors must work with each large bank to
develop, in readily accessible form, the information so
identified. Contingency planning should also identify
any problems in existing legislation that would make
it difficult to resolve a large bank failure quickly. This
will require the extensive use of scarce supervisory
resources, but in the long run this activity would be
more productive in bringing about a stable and
efficient financial system than a lot of the current
“policy reform” activities which are consuming huge
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49 See Calomiris (2009b) for an interesting and persuasive view of the underlying cause of banking crises-namely “risk-inviting microeconomic
rules of the banking game that are established by government have always been the key additional necessary condition to producing a
propensity for banking distress, whether in the form of a high propensity for banking panics or a high propensity for waves of bank failures.”
50 Credibility is unlikely to be gained by speeches like that given by President Obama (Sept. 14, 2009), who stated that ‘those on Wall Street
cannot resume taking risks without regard for [the] consequences, and expect that next time, American taxpayers will be there to break their
fall". The speech failed to provide any credible steps that would alter the perception of the existence of TBTF among financial institutions or
their creditors. Similarly, Governor Carney’s speech of October 26, 2009, while making a number of excellent points, ended with a plea to
market participants. He said, "we do expect those fevered battlefield vows [from those who received extraordinary assistance] to be respected
through daily peacetime concern for and contributions to building a better, more resilient financial system". Financial system participants are
not going to behave out of the goodness of their hearts. They respond to incentives, and the authorities’ job is to find the incentives that
promote private (and public) sector behaviours that are consistent with a safe and efficient financial system. Commentary 311 | 19
amounts of resources but are likely to achieve little
success. One important dimension of resolution
mechanisms concerns the complexity and
international scope of large financial conglomerates.
This is a difficult area for authorities, particularly
since bankruptcy legislation is national, but failures 
of large institutions are international. Harmonization
of national bankruptcy regimes is a long way off,
but nevertheless, the authorities in each country
need to analyze how they can address these difficult
issues, imperfect though the actions may be.
Because each large bank problem is likely to 
be unique, the idea of “living wills” for these
institutions may be of some assistance. The
information contained in such documents could
assist supervisors in their understanding of a given
bank’s operations. As part of the living will, an
institution would develop a recovery plan outlining
how an institution would address capital and
liquidity issues so as to remain a viable entity. For
example, the institution may propose the sale of
non-core assets or ways it could scale back its
activities should its capital become, or is likely to
become, impaired. 
Finally, the authorities’ incentives to use TBTF
might also be reduced if creditors’ losses did not
generate liquidity issues. Reducing the liquidity
risks faced by uninsured depositors would reduce
the risks of spillovers arising from a large bank’s
problems. Special resolution mechanisms could
contain provisions that would allow uninsured
creditors to realize some portion of their claims on
a failed bank early in the resolution process.
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Resisting Policy Proposals that will not likely
Decrease use of TBTF 
Authorities must resist the temptation to “do
something” that will, in the end, increase the
likelihood that TBTF will be used. For example,
more intrusive supervision of large banks, a tax on
banks identified as systemically important and
supervisors becoming more involved in bank
investment decisions are unlikely to be of much
help. The more supervisors and legislators become
involved in directing large bank activities, the more
responsibility they take on with regard to bank
failures. Failures will be even more unacceptable in
such a supervisory world, increasing the likelihood
of TBTF use. 
In this regard, the current approach of
Superintendent of Financial Institutions Dickson
has much to recommend it. Her office attempts to
satisfy itself that each large bank is well run, that it
has implemented appropriate risk-management
strategies, sound operational risk policies, etc. But
banks, themselves, remain responsible for the
outcomes of their decisions. 
Policies that propose limits on the range of bank
activities or their size are also unlikely to be useful
in reducing the reliance on TBTF. Proposals that
only “narrow” banks, those holding very low-risk
assets, would be regulated and have access to the
financial safety net are ill-considered for many
reasons. In such a regime, most financial activities
would be carried out in the unregulated sector
during normal times and and then flee to the safety
of a regulated regime during times of turmoil as
depositors and creditors seek the protection of a
narrow bank. The profitability of narrow banks is
likely to be low, jeopardizing their long-run
existence and could raise the overall costs of
financial intermediation. To deal with this problem,
narrow banks are likely to establish links with the
unregulated sector, which would likely result in
further contagion across the regulated and
unregulated sectors. Finally, depending on the
activities permitted to them, narrow banks may
find it very difficult to hedge interest rate and other
risks that are fundamental to the business of
banking.
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51 Herring (2009b) has stated “if the inevitable tendency to oversupply bailouts during crises is not to lead to greater systemic risk, the
regulatory authorities will need to devise ways of resolving institutions without creating intolerable spillovers. The financial authorities could
accomplish more by doing less, if they can credibly restore a role for market discipline in the system by devising a credible resolution plan for
every systemically important institution.”  | 20 Commentary 311
A limit on the size of individual banks is an
equally poor suggestion because it ignores the
fundamental reason why TBTF policies are used-
the systemic risk or contagion that would follow
the failure of a single large institution. Splitting
large institutions into many smaller, but similar
banks would not solve the problem because
contagion in the financial sector is positively related
to these similarities (Goodhart 2009). Unless one
can find a way to make these smaller banks
different from each, this proposal does not look
very hopeful. Finally, the costs of intermediation
services provided by the financial sector would
likely rise as smaller banks would be unable to take
advantage of the benefits associated with larger size.
Similarly, proposals that suggest collecting reams
of additional data from entities that are not
currently supervised as a means of identifying risks
in the financial system are also problematic
(Freedman and Goodlet 2007). There are four
major deficiencies in these proposals. First, the data
will never be timely enough for the authorities to
take any actions when highly concentrated or one-
sided positions in markets or assets build up.
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Second, and worse from a TBTF perspective,
providing data to the authorities will only pressure
them to bail out institutions or markets if problems
arise. After all, market participants will say, “The
authorities had the information and didn’t act in
time, so they should bail us out.”
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Third, forcing the disclosure of additional
information will be expensive, both to produce and
to analyze, and will reduce the effectiveness 
of markets.
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Finally, gathering information about non-bank
financial entities not currently supervised is likely to
lead to their regulation. This will very likely result
in the extension of the financial safety net and an
increased probability of TBTF being used in
broader circumstances. As former vice-chair of the
US Federal Reserve Bank Don Kohn, states: 
“Gathering additional information about the risk
profiles of currently less-regulated institutions is
unlikely to yield insights that can be acted upon
and may create a false sense of comfort among
market participants, which could make the system
substantially more risky (Kohn 2007).”
Perhaps the most ill-considered proposal put
forward to prevent bank failures is to identify
certain institutions as systemically important by
levying a tax on them. Such a tax will likely further
entrench TBTF expectations among creditors and
does nothing to deal with the way creditors
currently monitor large banks, the fact that large
banks take on risks that are not socially optimal, or
the misallocation of resources arising from the
subsidy provided to large banks as part of the
government’s implicit guarantee.
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According to Dickson, identifying financial
institutions as systemically important would
increase the risk of TBTF use since banks
designated as systemically important would receive
higher ratings from ratings agencies, have a lower
cost of funds (which would confer substantial
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52 However, some such data may be helpful, even if they are not very timely, since they could be used to examine strategies followed by
participants in certain markets, allowing supervisors to raise any concerns they have in this regard with large banks (Le Pan 2009).
53 It is not even clear what type of action governments could take even if they had all of the requisite information. And in the absence of
specific powers that will actually address the problem, the most likely response is some form of TBTF. Recall this is how the Canadian
government got into banking supervision in the first place. While the government did not have supervisory responsibilities for banks, the
Minister of Finance of the day received information indicating the Home Bank was in serious financial trouble. The Minister took no action
and after Home Bank failed, he was criticized for the lack of action. The government then came to the conclusion that to receive information
without the powers to do anything about it was not a good place to be and bank regulation was born in Canada.
54 Some have argued that the forced disclosure of information would help markets incorporate new information on a continuous basis and
serve to reduce large and sudden reactions to unfavourable information. The problem with this approach is that if market participants find
the new information to expensive to analyze on an on-going basis they will not incorporate this information on a continuous basis. And
when uncertainty arises, it is likely that such unincorporated information will suddenly become quite valuable and worth analyzing,
contributing to large and discontinuous reactions in the market in response to unfavourable events.
55 In addition, the tax on large banks identified as systemically important could result in taxpayers and bank customers paying twice for bank
bailouts-first through the initial bailout, and then because the incidence of any such tax would likely fall not on bank shareholders, but on
bank customers who do not have alternatives to dealing with banks (small- and medium-sized businesses, residential mortgage and personal
loan customers, and small depositors).Commentary 311 | 21
competitive benefits to these banks) and would be
subject to even less market discipline and very likely
take on more risks. Furthermore, such a policy
would defeat other important goals such as having
competition in the market and having an efficient
financial system. Proponents of this policy also
want to raise capital charges to systemically-
important banks (on what basis is not clear) and
this could create all sorts of unintended
consequences. Capital requirements that are too
large can be very costly from the perspective of
creating a safe and efficient financial system.
Expectations likely would be created that
systemically-important banks could never fail, even
if an effective and efficient resolution for closing
such an institution existed. Supervisors in these
circumstances might become excessively
conservative and inhibit financial system efficiency
or resort to using only TBTF to deal with large
problem banks.
In addition to all of these points, there is perhaps
an even more telling criticism. The definition of a
systemically important bank is context-dependent
and cannot be arrived at objectively. For example,
countries with sophisticated financial sectors like
Canada have gone to considerable effort and
expense to establish risk-proof clearing and
settlement systems that handle large value
payments, securities transactions or foreign
exchange transactions. These risk-proofed systems
have dealt effectively with one major source of
contagion should one or more large banks fail.
Thus, from this perspective, there is no need to
designate any large Canadian bank as TBTF
worthy. But in countries where these clearing and
settlement systems have not been risk-proofed
properly, large banks would have to be designated
as systemically important since the failure of one
large bank could clearly lead to the failure of other
large banks through contagion in these systems. At
the same time, once countries with poorly designed
financial systems had designated most of their
banks as systemically important, they may lose their
incentives to fix their systems and resign themselves
to TBTF if any bank approaches failure. The same
issue would arise in countries which did not have
effective bank resolution or early intervention/early
resolution arrangements, appropriate bankruptcy
laws, or appropriate accounting or disclosure
policies. 
The actions taken in other countries in this
regard are important, since countries that identify
certain banks as being systemically important
(TBTF) may be perceived as having explicit
government support in the event of financial
difficulties. If other countries did not do the same
for their large banks, their banks would be at a
competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the banks which
had been so designated. This would lead to
competitive inequities in that banks designated
systemically important may have avoided costs and
changes in strategies that banks in other countries
may have had to incur and may well gain market
share at the expense of banks not so designated by
their home jurisdiction.
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Finally, such a proposal may create “border”
problems between those institutions designated as
systemically important and those not so designated.
Once a definition for systemically important is
established, there will be incentives for institutions
to take actions to place themselves on one side of
the boundary or the other, according to their
perceptions of which side is most advantageous 
to them.
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56  Recall this was a strong motivating factor for the Basel Capital Accords, since no one country wanted to disadvantage its banks in the global
markets by raising required minimum capital ratios when other countries would not. The Basel Accord provided a means for the largest
countries to move together (although still with considerable interpretation latitude), and later to impose the Accord outcome on virtually all
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Conclusion
To reduce the use of TBTF is going to take good
analysis, political will and a coordinated strategy.
After Washington bailed out Bear Stearns in early
2008, market expectations were strongly reinforced
that large investment banks and bank holding
companies were entitled to TBTF treatment.
57  But
when, subsequently, the Bush administration
declined to help Lehman Brothers, market
participants began to wonder whether the
government would, or could, bail out large banks
and large bank holding companies. As Cochrane
(2009) notes, “Suddenly it made perfect sense to
run like mad.” 
Indeed, once everyone expects a bailout,
government has to provide it or else chaos will
result. A good argument can be made that neither
Bear Stearns nor Lehman Brothers was
“systemically important," but the expectation of a
bailout for Lehman after Bear Stearns was bailed
out was systemically important. When it did not
occur, market participants began seriously to
question what future actions US policymakers
would take. This uncertainty led to a massive
scramble for liquidity and safety. The lesson to be
learned is that TBTF expectations must be tackled
in calmer times with a consistent and coordinated
strategy.
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The recent global financial turmoil was not solely
the fault of the authorities, although a persuasive
case can be made that lax US monetary policy led
to the creation of major asset price bubbles as well
as policies directed to favouring home ownership
and flaws in the design of the regulatory
framework. Such regulatory flaws created the
wrong incentives and allowed major loopholes to be
exploited and an excess of confidence that a
securitized market-based financial sector would be
more robust in the face of shocks than a more
bank-based financial sector. 
However, the private sector must also shoulder
much of the blame. Investors, including large
sophisticated insurance companies and pension
funds, failed to understand, or more likely in the
case of sophisticated investors, chose not to
understand or to ignore, the risks associated with
the assets they were purchasing. Nevertheless,
private-sector financial system participants should
not be expected to have the public interest as the
focus of their operations. It is the responsibility of
public policy makers to design financial system
regulatory and supervisory arrangements that will
provide private and public-sector participants with
the incentives to take actions that will contribute to
the achievement of a stable and efficient financial
system. In the recent financial turmoil, public
policy makers generally failed in this role.
The authorities essentially made two serious
errors during the recent financial turmoil that led to
the inappropriate use of TBTF policies. First, they
were totally unprepared and had not thought
through how they would deal with large financial
entities experiencing solvency threatening events.
The authorities also demonstrated little
appreciation for how existing regimes that govern
banks and other financial institutions were likely 
to lead to financial instability. When the problems
arose, they had no coherent strategy to deal 
with them. 
This led to the second error: chaotic, seat-of-the-
pants decision-making in the midst of the turmoil,
without clear statements as to whose interests were
being served and what principles were being
followed (Johnson 2009). In light of the first error,
it is completely understandable why the authorities
in all countries that experienced difficulties
committed their second error.
However, the authorities now are on the verge of
making their most serious error-failing to address
the overuse of TBTF as the most important issue
facing them. If this fundamental problem is not
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58 Not all of the outcomes following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy were bad. The remaining large investment banks either merged or
became bank holding companies and thus became subject to greater supervision. However, bringing investment banks in under the bank
holding company umbrella meant that the safety net (and TBTF) was extended to entities that formerly had not been seen as benefiting from
such policies.Commentary 311 | 23
addressed, it is likely that when financial difficulties
rise again, they will cost more to resolve and will be
more destabilizing than what has occurred recently.
It won’t be easy developing alternatives, especially
since taking away subsidies embedded in the
current system requires considerable political will.
But to achieve the objectives of a stable and
efficient financial system, the reliance on TBTF
policies must be virtually eliminated.
While Canada did not experience the same
difficulties as other countries, it was hit by the
fallout and introduced TBTF-type policies,
although there were no bailouts of large banks. 
And while Canada is fortunate to have a better
regulatory framework than most, the authorities
still need to address a number of the suggested
policy actions discussed above. To some extent,
Canada was lucky the last time, and should serious
financial difficulties confront Canadian banks, it is
likely to resort to the full range of TBTF actions
unless it addresses these concerns. 
However, there is little evidence that other major
countries want to address the TBTF issue, and
Canada will find it difficult to tackle the challenge
alone. There is an ongoing risk that Canada will be
saddled with international initiatives that will make
our banking system less stable and less efficient,
increasing the likelihood of TBTF being applied in
the future.
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Appendix
TBTF and Large Banks 
To understand why TBTF is almost always used
to resolve failing large banks requires a consideration
of what it is that banks do and why their failure is
usually seen as a more catastrophic event than is the
failure of a large non-bank entity.
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(i) Why are Banks Special? 
Banks and other deposit-taking institutions are
thought to exist because they solve a contracting
problem between the ultimate borrowers of funds
and the ultimate lenders of funds, where the
results of the borrowers’ use of funds can be
observed by the lenders only at considerable cost
to themselves. A bank solves this problem by
acting as the agent for the lenders (that is, the
bank’s creditors) to monitor the use of the
borrowed funds and the results of the borrowers’
projects.
60 Lenders also benefit because a bank
will typically hold a well-diversified portfolio of
assets. However, banks carry out their
intermediation operations in a way that leaves
them potentially vulnerable, in that they typically
finance longer-term assets which have uncertain
future cash flows with fixed-price demand and
shorter-term deposits. Should enough of the
bank’s creditors become concerned about the
bank’s ability to repay its claims, they can create
“runs” with self-fulfilling expectations on the bank
by removing their deposits at little or no notice.
This action can make it very difficult for the bank
to repay these deposits because it may not be able
to rapidly liquidate its illiquid assets without
suffering considerable losses. Such a scenario
could result in a bank becoming insolvent. 
This form of banking occurs across many
countries and over time, suggesting that the way
in which banks solve the monitoring problem
between ultimate lenders and borrowers is
particularly valuable (or unique) to society in spite
of the vulnerability created by “borrowing short
and lending long.” The fact that banks typically
borrow at terms shorter than at which they lend is
also seen by some as a mechanism to discipline
more effectively bank management than would be
case if the bank were to borrow long-term funds
(Calomiris and Kahn 1991). The argument is that
with shorter-term deposits maturing all of the
time and new shorter-term deposits being raised
creditors will continuing assess the bank’s ability
to repay its liabilities on a regular basis.
The quality of an institution’s portfolio is the
fundamental determinant of the credibility of its
promises to repay depositors. In part, this
credibility can be fostered by the development of a
strong reputation for safe operations-reputation
capital. However, the development of such a
reputation can take time, and even institutions
with good reputations may find themselves in
situations where they turn out to have been
inadequately diversified, or have been unlucky and
suffered losses on some loans. This concern can be
dealt with by the institution holding sufficient
levels of equity capital to absorb these losses
which, along with sufficient liquidity, make its
promise to repay depositors and other creditors
more credible. This credibility to depositors can
also be improved by the activities of certain third
parties. Being a member of a deposit insurance
arrangement or being subject to government
licensing and supervision arrangements are means
by which the promise to repay depositors can be
made more credible. Bank creditors will be of the
view that deposit insurers and government
regulators will monitor the financial condition of
C.D. Howe Institute
59 Having said this, it must be acknowledged that TBTF policies have been extended to non-bank financial institutions (e.g., AIG Insurance in
the US) and even to non-financial corporations (e.g., Chrysler and General Motors in Canada and the US). 
60 The work of John Chant for the Bank of Canada in 1987 concluded that credit intermediation by banks is best explained by the delegated
monitoring class of models, in which banks are an efficient means for providing financing in the face of costly information asymmetries. See
also the work of Douglas Diamond July 1984, Review of Economic Studies, and Stephen Williamson 1986, Journal of Monetary
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banks and would not allow banks to become
insolvent, perhaps using TBTF policies to manage
a large bank failure. Another third party activity is
the lender of last resort operations of central
banks. This activity reassures creditors that as long
as the bank is judged to be solvent, the central
bank will provide the necessary liquidity for the
bank to be able to repay its liabilities at all times.
These activities by governments and their agents
form what is usually called the financial safety net.
While this intermediation activity is the most
important role of banks, they also perform two
other roles that differentiate them from other
types of entities. First, commercial banks are key
players in clearing and settlement systems as they
offer transaction accounts and engage in lending
activities that are used to make payments for
almost all transactions involving the exchange of
funds for goods, financial assets or services. By
facilitating decentralized exchange, the banks’
activities in the payments and other clearing and
settlement systems are critical to the functioning
of a market economy. 
Second, banks are heavily involved market
activities. Banks use markets to borrow large
amounts of short-term funds to finance their
lending activities. They also use a technique called
securitization to permit them to originate more
mortgages and other types of loans than they can
carry on their balance sheets, relying instead on
their ability to sell securitized loan packages into
the market. They use markets to hedge their own
and customers’ interest rate and foreign exchange
risks. Finally, banks are active participants in
securities and foreign exchange markets and in
some cases have taken on important market-
making roles. While this role is not unique to
banks, their activities make them very important
participants in markets.
(ii) Why are a Safety Net and Special Regulations
Applied to Banks?
Given that banks appear to effectively solve
certain contracting problems in a valuable way,
but are subject to vulnerabilities because of the
way they operate, governments have felt the need
to create a financial safety net and a special
regulatory framework for them. The difficulty
with a financial safety net is that it may reduce the
incentives for banks to invest in reputational or
equity capital. It may also reduce the incentives
for creditors to monitor the riskiness of the
activities of banks, resulting in less market
discipline (this is known as the moral hazard
problem). This is particularly problematic when a
bank has suffered losses and has low amounts of
capital. In this situation, significant incentives
may exist for a bank to take greater risks. 
Traditionally, there have been three reasons
provided for the creation of a financial safety net
and special regulatory framework for banks: (a)
consumer protection; (b) containing moral
hazard; and, (c) containing systemic risk. 
(a) Consumer Protection 
This rationale for regulating banks is based on
the view that certain classes of depositors/creditors
are not able (or feel that it is not cost-effective) to
assess the riskiness of the banks to which they
have lent funds, and that these creditors need
protection because they have a considerable
proportion of their wealth represented by claims
on these banks. Moreover, if enough depositors
conclude that their bank is in trouble, they can
create a run on a bank with self-fulfilling
expectations. This rationale may also be based on
the view that customers of banks (borrowers or
depositors) may not be able to influence the terms
and conditions of the service or product provided
by these institutions. To deal with the first
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concern, the regulatory framework typically
provides for: (i) protection schemes for some
depositors (e.g., Canada Deposit Insurance
Corporation in Canada) to reimburse them for
losses arising from the insolvency of a bank and to
prevent bank runs; (ii) capital adequacy
requirements and other risk containment
mechanisms (including supervisory agencies aimed
at reducing the probability of bank failures); and,
(iii) special regimes to deal with the bankruptcy
and liquidation of a bank. To deal with standard
of service concerns, the regulatory framework
typically contains rules governing business
conduct or market practices (e.g., competition
rules or disclosure rules). 
(b) Moral Hazard 
This rationale for regulation is a consequence of
attempting to protect depositors from losses. If
governments introduce protection schemes to
compensate some depositors from losses resulting
from the insolvency of a bank, or if uninsured
depositors and other creditors believe that the
government will compensate them for their losses
(i.e., they believe that there is an implicit
government guarantee), then these creditors will
have little or no incentive to assess the riskiness of
their claims on individual banks. Risky banks will
be able to attract funds on the same terms and
conditions as more prudently operated banks
because the creditors of the riskier banks will not
charge them more for lending funds to them, or
will not reduce the quantity of funds lent to them.
Because market discipline is undermined,
governments feel compelled to put in place
prudential regulations and supervision to limit
their financial exposure and to offset the
regulatory incentives for banks to undertake
excessively risky activities, especially in situations
where the bank is in financial difficulty.
(c) Systemic Risks 
Another rationale used to support the existence of
a special regulatory framework for banks is a
concern about systemic risk or externalities. The
failure of one institution raises the risk of
contagion, that is, the risk that otherwise healthy
banks would subsequently fail as a consequence of
the first failure, either because of dealings with the
failed institution or because of perceived
similarities with the failed bank. The  participation
of banks in the payment or other clearing and
settlement systems is often seen as a primary
mechanism for spreading the contagion. This
systemic risk rationale essentially rests on the
notion that banks do not adequately take account
of the costs associated with their possible failure
and thus accept more risk in their various activities
than society would prefer (that is, the costs of their
failure are not internalized or restricted to a bank’s
shareholders and creditors). This rationale may
also be supported by the view that the financial
sector is more “fragile” or susceptible to contagion
problems than is the non-financial sector of the
economy and that the costs of failure are more
significant for the economy given their role in
providing credit to households and businesses.
Hence, it is felt necessary to regulate banks.
61
Most regulation and supervision of banks involves
ex ante, or preventive, activities aimed at reducing
the probability of bank failures to very low levels,
or involve the use of special resolution
mechanisms to deal with failing banks or the
application of TBTF policies to banks about to
fail. This differs from arrangements applied to
non-financial entities, which are largely remedial
or ex post and primarily involve the distribution 
of a failed entity’s assets to its creditors.
C.D. Howe Institute
61 Other social costs associated with a large bank insolvency include large amounts of legal and accounting resources to wind up a bank, potential
disruptions in financial markets and poorly designed clearing and settlement systems, the costs of sorting out competing creditor claims, the
uncertainty of creditors as to the timing and eventual outcome of bankruptcy proceedings, and the cost to debtors of a failed bank because
promised access to loans ceases to exist and the debtors’ collateral may be tied up at the failed bank and unavailable to secure borrowings at
another bank.References
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